Bolster international cooperation
Pathway for climate-resilient fisheries
Enhance international cooperation
Because fish stocks will increasingly change in their distribution patterns, in some cases moving in search of more suitable thermal habitat, the geographic scale of fishery management must change as well in order to manage stocks sustainably across their new ranges. This, in turn, will require greater degrees of subnational and international governmental cooperation and flexibility.
Supporting Case Study
The Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA) is an example of an agreement that has come together among like-minded countries to collectively manage South Pacific tuna resources. By combining their collective EEZs, the PNA countries are able to cover enough geographic scale to effectively manage shared resources. Many of the conditions underpinning this agreement are consistent with principles of collective action, such as shared experiences, leadership, common goals and enhanced compliance. In addition, the way in which harvest opportunities are shared among countries appears to be somewhat durable to geographic change of stocks, with access opportunities changing over time in response to changes to where fishing activity is concentrated.
Learn more here: How can building and strengthening international institutions help achieve climate resilient fisheries?
Important factors in fostering international cooperationExpand All
Strengthening of existing or development of new multi-national and sub-national agreements to ensure adequate authority to effectively manage new stock conditions and distributions and inclusivity of affected parties
Agreement and collaboration on the basic science concerning the stock(s) of interest;
This can be facilitated through enhanced assessment and data-sharing agreements as well as by data collection and monitoring at appropriate ecosystem scales.
Regional agreement on management goals for changing stocks and stock portfolios (e.g., small pelagics, reef fishes, groundfish, etc.);
For instance, should countries agree to manage fisheries resources to a specific single-species (e.g., MSY or MEY) or multispecies (e.g., stock complex MEY/MSY) reference point?
Access and resource sharing agreements, which may include mechanisms such as:
Transferable permits and/or cross-border vessel access agreements;
Portfolio-based access agreements that shift in response to real-time data;
Side payments (e.g., where country A compensates country B for the protection of a key life history stage of a stock in country B’s waters).
Supportive domestic institutions and policies that can carry out the necessary functions of the international agreement, including through dedicated funding for creating new institutions where necessary. This will require, in part, that domestic policies and politics are aligned with the international agreement’s goals and purpose.